Quantum clouds are collections of configurations of intertwined contexts or maximal observables with operational preparation-and endpoints. Although counterfactual because of complementarity, when interpreted classically and realistically, certain configurations induce relations, such as true-implies-false, true-implies-true, but also nonseparability. When combined, these clouds form other clouds which deliver the strongest form of classical value indefiniteness. However, the choice of the respective configuration among all such collections, and thus the relation of its endpoints, remains arbitrary and cannot be motivated by some superselection principle inherent to quantum or classical physics.
One way to conceptualize quantized systems is in terms of (black) boxes with input and output interfaces. Such quantum boxes exhibit certain features usually not encountered by classical devices, among them complementarity; that is, the incapacity to measure all conceivable observables either simultaneously or one after another. Alas, even quasiclassical models such as Moore's initial state identification problem [1] for what would later become (irreversible) finite automata theory in computer science, and also Wright's generalized urn model [2, 3] mimic quantum complementarity to a certain degree -indeed, formally up to quantum logics with separable sets of two-valued states [4, Theorem 0, p. 67] equivalent to partition logics [5] .
Already Specker [6] contemplated about generalized exotic behaviors even beyond quantum boxes, whereby his criteria for "weirdness" were grounded in classical counterfactuals discussed by scholastic theology. An immediate objection [7] to the use of counterfactuals is that they presuppose a sort of realism not operationally [8] supported by quantum mechanics. Indeed, the partial algebra approach of Kochen and Specker [4, 9, 10] disallows operations among complementary observables whilst making heavy use of intertwined collections of complementary maximal operators.
In what follows we shall also consider counterfactual (in Specker's scholastic terminology [6] Infuturabilien) configurations of contexts, or, used synonymously, maximal operators which are intertwined in one or more common observable. A necessary condition for the existence of intertwines is the dimensionality of vector space being higher than two. (In dimension two or less contexts are either identical or disjoint.)
Clouds, that is, counterfactual configurations of contexts may have various realizations and representations: it may have (i) a quantum mechanical realization in terms of intertwining orthonormal bases; (ii) a pseudo-classical realization in terms of partition logics which in turn have automaton logic or generalized urn models; (iii) classical if there is only a single context involved; (iv) none of the above (such as a tightly interlinked "triangle" configuration of three contexts with two atoms per context). Suffice it to say that (i) does not imply (ii), and vice versa, and (iii) is a subalgebra of all the other groups enumerated.
The commonly used method is to explore configurations of type (i) with a quantum realization, upon which a classical interpretation, if it exists, is "forced" in terms of uniform classical truth-false propositions. Such value assignments can be formalized by two-valued ({0, 1}) states or value assignments which are additive and add up to one if the propositions are exclusive and within a single context. The intuition behind is this: any d-dimensional context or maximal observable can be interpreted as an array of detectors after a d-port beam splitter [11] . In an ideal experiment, only one detector clicks (associated with the proposition that the system is in the respective state is true), whereas all the other d − 1 detectors remain silent.
Such uniform classical interpretations are supposed to be context-independent; that is, the value on intertwining observables which are common to two or more contexts is independent of the context. Besides context-independence of truth assignments at the intertwining observables, various variants of such measures assume conditions of increasing strength: (I) The "measures" or value assignments employed in socalled "contextuality inequalities" merely assume that every atomic proposition is either true or false, regardless of the other atomic propositions in that context which are simultaneously measurable [12] . This allows all possible 2 d possibilities of value assignment in a d-dimensional context with d atoms, thereby vastly expanding the collection of possible value assignments. With this expansion, all Kochen-Specker sets trivially have value assignments: if there are k atoms involved, there are 2 k such value assignments. (II) The prevalent assumption of two-valued states or value assignments, also used by Kochen and Specker [4] as well as Pitowsky [13] , is that only a single one of the d atoms within a d-dimensional context is true, and all the others are false; therefore any isolated d-dimensional context can have only d such standard two-valued value assignments. (III) An even more restricted rule of value assignment abandons uniform definiteness and supposes [14] [15] [16] that, if all d − 1 but one atoms in a d dimensional context is false, the remaining one is true, and if one atom within a d-dimensional context is true, all remaining d − 1 atoms are false. This latter value assignments allows for partial functions which can be value indefinite. The existence of type (III) implies the existence of type (II) which in turn implies the existence of type (I) value assignments.
The commonly used method then seeks configurations with "exotic" classical interpretations. Again, exoticism may ex- press itself in various forms or types. In what follows configurations of intertwined contexts with two fixed propositions as "start" and "end" points a and b will be studied; as well as methods for constructing such configurations with particular relational properties. Whenever there is no preferred, less so unique, path connecting a and b, all such connections should be treated on an equal basis. We shall call any such collection of counterfactual connections "clouds connecting a and b", and depict it with a cloud shape symbol, as drawn in Figure 1 . (This can in principle be generalized to more than two endpoints.) Thereby, as the endpoints a and b remain fixed, one can ask what kind of (classical) relational information can be inferred from such two-point quantum clouds. As it turns out, for fixed a and b quantum clouds can be found which realize a wide variety of conceivable relational properties between a and b. Table I enumerates these relations whose realizations in terms of concrete collection of intertwined orthonormal bases are not unique.
For quantum mechanics, a and b can be formalized by the two one dimensional projection operators E a = |a a| and E b = |b b|, respectively. For the sake of demonstration we shall study configurations in which |a = 1, 0, 0
, that is, the quantum prediction yields a probability | b|a | 2 = 1 2 to find the quantum in a state |b if it has been prepared in a state |a . This configuration can be extended to endpoints with (noncollinear and nonorthogonal) arbitrary relative location by the techniques introduced in Ref. [16] .
(a) A quantum cloud configuration for which classical value assignments allow b to be either true or false if a is true is the firefly configuration [28, pp. 21, 22] , de- Fig. 1, p . 182] is a quantum cloud configuration which classically enforces a trueimplies-b false: if a quantum system is prepared in such a way that a is true -that is, if it is in the state E a -and measured along E b , and |a and |b are not orthogonal or collinear, then any observation of b given a amounts to a probabilistic proof of nonclassicality: because although quantum probabilities do not vanish, classical value assignments predict that b never occurs. Minimal quantum cloud configurations for classical a trueimplies-b false, as well as a true-implies-b true value assignments [of type (II)] can be found in [30] .
As Cabello pointed out [44, 45] , the original Specker bug configuration cannot go beyond the quantum prediction probability threshold | b|a | 2 = is a sublogic of a quantum logic whose realization is enumerated in Ref. [16, Fig. 3 . TIFS serve as a toolbox to obtain clouds which, if they are interpreted classically, exhibit other interesting relational properties. For instance, the parallel composition (pasting) of two quantum clouds of the TIFS type, which one TIFS classically demanding a true-impliesb false and the other TIFS classically demanding b trueimplies-a false, results in a quantum cloud which has two observables a and b which are classically always "opposite": if one is true, the other one is false, and vice versa.
(e) The parallel composition (pasting) of two quantum clouds of the TITS type, with one TITS classically demanding a true-implies-b true and the other TITS classically demanding b true-implies-a true, results in a quantum cloud which has two observables a and b which are classically nonsepable, which is a sufficient criterium for nonclassicality [4, Theorem 0, p. 67]. As pointed out by Portillo [50] this is equivalent to a is true if and only if b is true (TIFFTS). (f) The parallel composition (pasting) of the two quantum clouds which respectively represent TIFS and TITS and identical endpoints a and b yields a a true-impliesb value indefinite cloud discussed in Ref. [16] .
The relevance of counterfactual arguments using quantum clouds for physics lies in the conceivable interpretation of elementary observations. Suppose a quantum is prepared "along" |a and, when measured measured "along" |b b|, turns out to be in that state |b ; that is, a detector associated with this latter property clicks. Now, depending on the quantum cloud considered, the following contradictory claims are justified:
1. if the quantum cloud allows both values then the claim is that there is no determination of the outcome; the event "popped up" from nowhere, ex nihilo, or, theologically speaking, has come about by creatio continua (cf Kelly James Clark's God-as-Curler metaphor [51] );
2. in the case of a TIFS cloud the system is truly quantum and cannot be classical;
3. in the case of a TITS cloud the system could be classical; 4. in case of a cloud inducing value indefiniteness the claim can be justified that the system cannot be classical, as no such event (not even its absence) should be recorded. Indeed, relative to the assumptions made, the (non)occurrence of any event at all is in contradiction to the classical predictions.
Conversely, if the experimenter observes no click in a detector associated with the state |b , then, depending on the quantum cloud considered, the following contradictory claims are justified:
1. as mentioned earlier, if the quantum cloud allows both values then there exists creatio continua (presently the orthodox majority position);
2. in the case of a TIFS cloud the system could be classical;
3. in case of a TITS cloud the system is truly quantum and cannot be classical;
4. just as mentioned earlier, in case of a cloud inducing value indefiniteness the claim can be justified that the system cannot be classical, as no such event (not even its absence) should be recorded.
As a result, depending on the quantum cloud considered, any (non)occurrence of some single outcome can be published (or rather marketed in venerable scientific journals) as a crucial experiment indicating that the associated system cannot be classical. Likewise, by taking other quantum clouds, any such outcome may be considered to be consistent with classicality: (non)classicality turns out to be means relative with respect to the quantum clouds considered. This arbitrariness could be avoided by some sort of "superselection rule" prioritizing or selecting particular quantum clouds over other ones. However, in the absence of such superselection rules a generalized Jayne's principle, or rather Laplace's principle of indifference, implies that any choice of a particular quantum cloud over other ones amounts to an "epistemic massaging" of empirical data, and their nonoperational, misleading overinterpretation in terms of a speculative ontology [7] ; or, to quote Peres [52] , unperformed experiments have no results". In contradistinction, it may not be too speculative to hold it for granted that the only operationally justified ontology is the assumption of a single one context, or its associated maximal observable.
